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Abstract
The issue of equilibrium selection in a duopoly game between a profit maximizing and a labour
managed firm is addressed under either price or quantity competition with product
differentiation. If firms can choose the timing of moves before competing in the relevant market
variable, the Bertrand game yields multiple equilibria, while the Cournot game has a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium with the profit maximizing firm in the leader’s role and the labour
managed firm in the follower’s role. Due to a lower total output, the Cournot-Stackelberg
equilibrium yields a lower level of social welfare as compared to the simultaneous equilibrium.
This reduces the incentive to transform an LM duopoly into a mixed one.
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1. Introduction
A large body of literature deals with the issue of choosing roles in sequential duopoly
games. In the context of duopolistic competition between profit maximizing (PM) firms, Gal-Or
(1985) and Dowrick (1986) show that, provided firms are symmetric, the slope of their respective
reaction functions in the relevant strategic variable, i.e., either price or quantity, determines
whether they prefer to act as a leader or a follower. Specifically, both firms would prefer to be
the leader (follower) in quantity (price) setting games if reaction functions are downward
(upward) sloping, due to the presence of strategic substitutability (complementarity) between
goods (see Bulow et al., 1985). The results reached by the above contributions are extended to
the case of differentiated products by Gal-Or (1985) and Boyer and Moreaux (1987).
In a recent paper, Okuguchi (1993b) investigates the preferences of labour managed (LM)
firms as for the distribution of roles under both Bertrand and Cournot competition and product
differentiation, finding out that, in sharp contrast to what happens when only entrepreneurial
firms are involved, in the case of a pure LM duopoly, reaction functions are upward sloping
regardless of the kind of competition, be that in prices or quantities. Hence, both LM duopolists
would prefer to act as a follower, independently of the strategic variable being set.
Even though the comparison between the payoffs accruing to duopolists in simultaneous
and sequential games, as well as the conclusions drawn from it, is relevant in itself, it does not
provide any answer to the main question, namely, whether firms’ preferences would allow for
any of the sequential or simultaneous equilibria to endogenously emerge as the equilibrium of
the underlying game one could envisage, i.e., a game where firms are first required to announce
the timing of their respective moves and then proceed to set the relevant variable in order to
maximize their own objective function in the basic market game. This issue has been tackled
in a very influential paper by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). They embed simultaneous and
sequential play into an extended game with observable delay where players must set both the
strategic variable of the basic game and the time to set that variable. The latter process is actually
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a logical preplay stage which is not observed. If players decide to move at the same time, a
simultaneous equilibrium is observed, and viceversa. It is noteworthy that the decision to play
early rather than at a later stage is not sufficient to yield Stackelberg leadership, since an
analogous decision by the rival determines the emergence of a simultaneous Nash equilibrium.
Thus, a Stackelberg equilibrium (or sequential play) with one player moving first and the rival
second will be the only subgame perfect equilibrium of the extended game if only one of the
two possible sequential play outcomes Pareto-dominates the simultaneous play outcome
(Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990, Theorem IV, p.37). Otherwise, when both players share the same
preferences over the sequence of moves and the follower’s payoff dominates that associated
with simultaneous play, then both sequential equilibria (as well as a mixed strategy one) are
subgame perfect equilibria of the extended game, so that in principle it is impossible to know
which of them will be actually observed (Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990, Theorem III, p.36).
Applying the tools provided by Hamilton and Slustky (1990), I want to address a question
which so far, to the best of my knowledge, has remained neglected, i.e., which preferences
characterize a mixed duopoly game between a profit maximizing and a labour managed firm,
and consequently which kind of equilibrium one can expect to obtain in such a game if firms
can decide the timing of moves before proceeding to compete in prices or quantities.
The behaviour of LM firms in mixed oligopolies has been described by several authors
(see, inter alia, Cremer and Crémer, 1992; Delbono and Rossini, 1992; Rossini and Scarpa,
1993; Okuguchi, 1993a). They have highlighted the peculiar behaviour of LM firms under
quantity competition, yielding an upward sloping reaction function1 instead of the usual
downward sloping one characterizing the PM firm. Nevertheless, all these contributions
investigate to various aims simultaneous play under either quantity or price setting behaviour.
I will show that, when a preplay stage in the sense of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) is introduced,
1. However, the reaction function of an LM firm is not necessarily upward sloping. See
Miyamoto (1982, p.13).
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(i) simultaneous play is not to be expected under neither form of competition; (ii) Cournot
behaviouryields as theunique subgameperfect equilibrium of theextended game the Stackelberg
equilibrium with the PM firm moving first, and (iii) Bertrand behaviour leads to multiple
equilibria in which both firms would prefer to move late or play in mixed strategies.
These results have some interesting implications as for the issue of reforming Eastern
European economies. Delbono and Rossini (1992) evaluate the feasibility of alternative reforms
of LM markets consisting in the passage to a mixed oligopoly or a horizontal merger where the
resulting firm maximizes an objective function in which a positive weight is assigned to either
entrepreneurial profit or social welfare. In analysing the case of a mixed duopoly, they only
consider simultaneous Nash equilibria. In the present paper, it is shown that only Stackelberg
equilibria should be taken into account. Hence, it turns out that a reform based on either the
privatization or the nationalization of a labour managed firm implies a smaller social gain than
it could be expected on the basis of previous literature.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Betrand competition is described in
Section 2. Section 3 is devoted to Cournot competition. Policy implications are discussed in
Section 4. Finally, Section 5 contains concluding comments.
2. Bertrand competition
In order to safeguard the comparability of what follows with at least a part of the existing
literature, I basically adopt the same symbology and assumptions as in Okuguchi (1993b). The
magnitudes related to the PM and LM firms are identified as P and C, respectively.
Both firms produce through the following technology:
where li is the amount of labour employed by firm i and xi is the quantity produced by the same
li = hi(xi), i = C , P (1)
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firm. The technology is fully characterized by the following derivatives:
i.e., the marginal productivity of labour is decreasing. Firms operate in a market for differentiated
goods, whose demand is
where (see Okuguchi, 1993b, pp.2-3):2
The inequalities in (4.1) state that (i) an increase in firm i’s price induces a decrease in the
demand for her own product, (ii) the two goods are substitutes, and (iii) the own price effect is
larger than the cross price effect. The inequalities in (4.2) are needed for the reaction function
of the LM firm to be positively sloped.
Since under the above assumptions Okuguchi (1993a,b) has shown that in a Bertrand
hi
’ > 0, hi
" > 0, (2)
xi = g
i(pi, pj), i , j = C , P , i ≠ j , (3)
∂gi/∂pi ≡ gii < 0, ∂gi/∂pj ≡ gji > 0, −gii > gji; (4.1)
∂2gi
∂pi∂pj
≡ gij
i ≤ 0, gj
i + pigij
i > 0. (4.2)
2. These assumptions, as well as those introduced in the remainder of the paper, hold for
instance when linear demand functions are considered.
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setting the reaction function of an LM firm is positively sloped irrespectively of the nature of
the rival, I can confine myself to investigate the characteristics of the entrepreneurial firm’s
reaction function. I am going to prove the following:
LEMMA 1. Under Bertrand competition, the reaction function of the profit maximizing firm
is upward sloping.
PROOF. The objective function of the PM firm is the following:
where kP defines the entrepreneurial firm’s fixed cost. The first order condition for profit
maximization w.r.t. price is:
Assume the second order condition is satisfied. It is known (see Bulow et al., 1985) that the
slope of the reaction function has the same sign as the derivative of (6) w.r.t pC:
Accordingly, it is sufficient to determine the sign of
piP
B
= pPg
P(pC, pP) − hP(xP) − kP (5)
∂piPB
∂pP
= gP(pC, pP) + pPgPP − hP’ gPP = 0. (6)
sign
∂pP
∂pC
= sign
∂2piPB
∂pP∂pC
(7)
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on the basis of the above assumptions, it is quickly established that the sign of (8) is positive.
Hence, the reaction function of the PM firm in the price space is upward sloping. Q.E.D.
Provided that the reaction function of the PM firm is positively sloped, as claimed in
Lemma 1, and the reaction function of the LM firm is also increasing, as shown by Okuguchi
(1993b), I am going to show what is stated in the following:
PROPOSITION 1. The extended Bertrand game between a profit maximizing firm and a labour
managed firm has multiple equilibria. None of them is simultaneous.
PROOF. Since both reaction functions are positively sloped, this setting is a special case of the
general situation depicted by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990, pp.36-41) in their Theorems III,
V(Aii) and VI. According to these theorems, when both reaction functions are increasing the
extended game with observable delay, where players first choose the timing of moves and then
proceed to play, has multiple equilibria. Namely, both sequential play are subgame perfect
equilibria; moreover, there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium in which firms randomize over
the strategies "moving first" and "moving second". This is due to the fact that both reaction
functions intersect the Pareto superior set, i.e., the set of all pair of prices yielding payoffs that
dominate those associated with the simultaneous equilibrium. Q.E.D.
∂2piPB
∂pP∂pC
= gC
P + pPgPC
P
− hP
’ gPC
P
− hP
"gP
PgC
P; (8)
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3. Cournot competition
In this Section, optimization w.r.t. quantity is analised. If the domain of the demand
function (3) is a rectangular region, it can be inverted to obtain:
with
Assumption (10.1) is borrowed from Okuguchi (1993b, p.4). Assumption (10.2), which is a bit
tighter than the corresponding condition in Okuguchi (1993b, p.4), and is borrowed from
Okuguchi (1993a, p.29), implies that firm i’s marginal revenue decreases as her rival’s output
increases. Provided firm i acts as a profit maximizer, this condition also implies that her own
reaction function is negatively sloped (see Novshek, 1985; Dixit, 1986; Okuguchi, 1993a, inter
alia).3 Provided that the reaction function of the LM firm is upward sloping (Okuguchi, 1993a,b),
the following holds:
PROPOSITION 2. The Stackelberg equilibrium with the profit maximizing firm moving first
and the labour managed firm moving second is the only subgame perfect equilibrium of the
extended Cournot game.
pi = f i(xi, xj), i , j = C , P , i ≠ j , (9)
∂f i/∂xj ≡ fji < 0; (10.1)
∂2f i
∂xi∂xj
≡ fiji ∈ [0, −
fji
xi
[. (10.2)
3.Cournot behaviourmay inducea profitmaximizing firmtoconsider her rivalsas strategic
complements.This happens when a large dominant firm competesagainst a population of smaller
rivals. See Bulow et al. (1985, p.500).
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PROOF. Since reaction functions exhibit opposite slopes, this is a special case of the general
setting defined by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990, pp.36-41) in their Theorems IV and V(B). If
there exists a preplay stage in which firms may choose the timing of moves, both decide to avoid
playing simultaneously and, having opposite preferences over the distribution of roles in
sequential play, since the PM firm prefers to lead while the LM firm prefers to follow, they
agree on appointing the leader’s role to the entrepreneurial firm.4 Q.E.D.
4. Policy implications
The results obtained in the previous sections have some interesting implications as far as
industrial policy is concerned. In the existing literature, the issue of restructuring Eastern
European economies has been usually tackled through the comparison of the welfare levels
associated with LM and mixed oligopolies under the assumption that firms adopt Cournot
behaviour and move simultaneously (Cremer and Cremèr, 1992; Delbono and Rossini, 1992;
Kahana, 1994). In particular, Delbono and Rossini (1992) evaluate the viability of alternative
reforms where the initial LM monopoly is turned into either a mixed duopoly or a firm with a
mixed objective function. In the former case an LM firm competes against either a private or a
public firm, while in the latter the monopolist maximizes an objective function which takes into
account either entrepreneurial profits or social welfare, together with value added per worker.
The authors conclude that, whatever reform is adopted, it leads to a welfare improvement with
respect to the status quo. In a recent note, Kahana (1994) shows that it wouldn’t be rational for
an LM monopolist to operate with several plants, so that as the relevant status quo one should
rather consider an LM oligopoly. However, this does not modify significantly the results reached
by Delbono and Rossini.
4. To the best of my knowledge, the only other case yielding unanimous preferences over
the distribution of roles has been provided by Singh and Vives (1984) analysing a duopoly game
between entrepreneurial firms where one firm optimizes w.r.t. price and the other w.r.t. quantity.
This yields reaction functions of opposite slopes.
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Thus, on the basis of the above remarks, it appears that the relevant comparison involves
the welfare levels associated with sequential play in both the LM and the mixed duopoly. For
obvious reasons, I adopt the same setting as in Delbono and Rossini (1992, p.228). Firms supply
a homogeneous product and behave à la Cournot. The inverse market demand function is linear:
Firms are characterized by the following technology:
denoting a decreasing marginal productivity of labour. Firm i’s total costs are:
where k denotes setup costs, which are assumed to be equal for both firms. Money wage is
normalised to 1. The objective function of an LM firm is defined as follows:
while that of a PM firm is:
p = a − xi − xj. (11)
xi = √li, (12)
Ci(xi) = xi2 + k (13)
vi
C
=
pxi − k
xi
2 (14)
pij
C
= pxj − xj
2
− k . (15)
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Finally, social welfare (gross of fixed costs) corresponds to:
where is total production.
4.1. Sequential play in the LM duopoly
Consider first the setting where both firms maximize income per worker, under the
assumption that firm i takes the lead. Thus, firm i must choose her quantity in order to maximize
the objective function (14) under the constraint given by the reaction function of firm j, which
is the following:
The total quantity produced in such a setting, which can be labelled as XSdc, is lower than the
quantity supplied in correspondence of the simultaneous Nash equilibrium, Xdc (see the
Appendix). As a consequence, the social welfare levels associated with the two equilibria can
be ranked as follows:
where the constraint on market size appearing in (18) warrants that both firms are active at the
simultaneousNashequilibrium (and thus also at the Stackelberg equilibrium,where they produce
less).
SW = aX − X
2
2
− ∑
i
xi
2 (16)
X = xi + xj
xj =
2k
a − xi
(17)
SWdc > SWSdc ∀a
2 > 8k , (18)
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4.2. Sequential play in the mixed duopoly
Assume now that a PM firm competes against an LM firm, in such a way that the former
leads while the latter follows. The entrepreneurial firm sets her own output level so as to solve
the following problem:
The total output supplied at equilibrium, labelled XSdcp, is smaller than the total output associated
with the simultaneousNash equilibrium,Xdcp (see the Appendix). Hence, the following inequality
can be quickly established:
The relative size of a and k must satisfy the inequality in (21) in order for both firms to operate
on the market at the simultaneous Nash equilibrium (see Delbono and Rossini, 1992, p.231).
4.3. Welfare comparison
I am now in a position to compare the welfare levels associated with the equilibria
considered in Delbono and Rossini (1992) with those generated by the Stackelberg equilibria
above. To this aim, I can resort to the following magnitudes:
max
xP
C
piP = pxP − xP
2
− k (19)
s .t .: xC =
2k
a − xP
(20)
SWdcp > SWSdcp ∀a
2 >
128
9 k . (21)
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The index in (22) measures the rate of increase in welfare due to the transformation of an LM
duopoly into a mixed duopoly, under the assumption of simultaneous play, while (23) yields
the same information under sequential play. In the viable range of parameters (a2>128k/9), it
can be established that, given the size of fixed costs, (i) both and increase as a
increases, and (ii) i.e., the increase in social welfare due to the envisaged reform
is smaller when sequential rather than simultaneous play is considered. In the light of the
perspective described by Delbono and Rossini (1992), who take also into account the possibility
of a horizontal merger between the two firms, the fact that makes merger appear
socially preferable to a mixed duopoly for a wider range of parameter values. As a last remark,
one can notice that, provided that with a linear market demand a public firm’s reaction function
is downward sloping,5 the analysis of a mixed duopoly with a public and an LM firm would
lead to conclusions largely analogous to those I have just outlined.
5. Conclusions
I have analysed the nature of the equilibria arising in a mixed duopoly setting where a
profit maximizing and a labour managed firm compete either in prices or in quantities. In the
light of the contribution by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), some of the several possible equilibria
can be selected as candidate subgame perfect equilibria of the extended game where firms first
declare their respective preferences over the timing of moves and then proceed to optimize
∆SWN =
SWdcp − SWdc
SWdc
(22)
∆SWS =
SWSdcp − SWSdc
SWSdc
(23)
∆SWN ∆SWS
∆SWN > ∆SWS,
SWSdcp < SWdcp
5. Delbono and Scarpa (1995) investigate the conditions under which a public firm’s
Cournot reaction function is upward sloping.
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respect to the relevant market variable.
UnderBertrandcompetition, due to the fact that reaction functions arebothupward sloping,
the extended game exhibits multiple equilibria, namely both the Stackelberg equilibria and one
in mixed strategies where firms randomize over moving first or second. Under Cournot
competition, the entrepreneurial firm’s reaction function is downward sloping while the labour
managed firm’s one is upward sloping, so that the extended game has a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium, i.e., the Stackelberg equilibrium where the profit maximizing firm is appointed the
leader’s role. Hence, the simultaneous Nash equilibrium in pure strategies does not emerge as
a subgame equilibrium from either the Bertrand or the Cournot extended game.
The analysis of Cournot competition has provided new insights on the relative feasibility
of alternative reform plans in Eastern European countries. Cournot-Stackelberg equilibria yield
lower total production as compared to simultaneous equilibria in both LM and mixed duopoly.
This amounts to saying that the social welfare level associated with sequential play is lower
than the one yielded by simultaneous play under both market regimes. Hence, the incentive to
turn an LM market into a mixed one appears now lower than it seemed to be on the basis of
previous contributions, while merger appears as a more advantageous alternative.
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Appendix
A.1. The leader’s output in the LM duopoly
The solution to the leader’s problem in the pure LM duopoly is given by:
where
The output of the follower, firm j, can be obtained through her reaction function (17). Since it
must be that the following constraint is to be satisfied:
A.2. The leader’s output in the mixed duopoly
When the PM firm plays the leader’s role in the mixed duopoly game, her production
amounts to:
where
xi =
2
3 a −
2k
3a + (η + φ)
1/3
−
a (6k + 3a 2 − (2F /a − 2a )2)/3
[27a 3(η + φ)]1/3 (a .1)
η = −8k
3 + 42a 2k 2 − 6a 4k − a 6
27a 3
φ = 13a √96a 2k 3 − 20k 4 − 24a 4k 2 + 2a 6k3 (a .2)
a > xi + xj,
a
2 > k(3 + 2√2). (a .3)
xP =
a
2

3
2
+
1
ψ1/3
+
ψ1/3
4
 , (a .4)
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Again, the quantity produced by the follower, in this case the LM firm, can be computed resorting
to her own reaction function (20). Finally, the condition that must be met in order for market
price to be positive at equilibrium is the following:
ψ = − (16k + a
2)
8 + a√8k 2 + a 2k2 . (a .5)
a
2 > 2k . (a .6)
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